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Abstract 
 
In this article we investigate the welfare effect of freight travel time savings.  The general setup of this 
article is to suppose that transport operators face a constraint on minimum travel time and to examine 
what is occurring when this minimum travel time is changed. We briefly  examine the current assessment 
methods and propose a less restrictive approach, in which we analyse how different economic agents 
trade off between the duration and cost of the different operations that are used in production and 
transport activities. We analyse how the change in the minimum travel time affects the different economic 
agents and investigate how these changes should be valued in cost benefit analysis.  
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1. Introduction 
In this article we investigate the value that should be placed on travel time savings 
for freight transportation in cost benefit analysis. While passenger transportation has 
received accurate attention from the community of transport economists, the value of 
time savings for freight lies far behind both regarding the availability of a widely 
recognised theoretical analysis and the number of empirical results available. This 
situation may be explained by the fact that the value of freight time savings only ranks 
second among the benefits of transport related projects, after the value of time for 
passengers. However, the lag in the research for freight value of time clearly exceeds 
what this second rank may justify.  
 
Such an observation motivates a research on how the welfare effects of freight 
transportation time savings should be accounted for in cost-benefit analysis.  
 
In the first section, we present the current paradigm that is in use in evaluation 
practice in industrialized countries, and underline the limits of this paradigm. In the 
second section, we derive a microeconomic model that describes how different agents 
have to deal with the duration of transport operations. In particular, we analyse how 
firms make trade offs between time and cost for different operations, including 
transportation of outputs. In the third section, we illustrate how savings on travel time 
affects the cost-duration trade off of firms and investigate how such effects should be 
taken into consideration in cost-benefit analysis. In the forth section, we investigate the 
monetary value that should be placed on these effects and implement our findings on the 
cost-benefit analysis of a set of projects in the UK.  
 
2. The current approaches and their limits 
In this section we give a brief overview of the current approaches used for the 
valuation of freight travel time savings. We also show the limits of these procedures and 
propose a number of improvements. 
Current approaches to value freight travel time savings 
The current approach in use in industrialized countries are summarised in 
Commission Européenne (1994) and Bruzelius (2001). Besides their differences, the 
commonalities among the different approaches, usually referred to under the name 
“factor cost approach”, are that they rely on a relationship between the duration and the 
cost of transport operations. In other words, the reduction of travel time affects the cost 
of transportation because it modifies the quantity of consumed inputs (vehicles.hours 
and drivers.hours). A more detailed framework, as is exemplified by the COBA Manual 
in England (DETR 2001), considers that operating costs of the vehicles vary with speed 
(as is common knowledge about fuel consumption).  
 
A general formulation of the transport production cost, taking into the effect of 
speed, can be proposed under the form:  
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 ct(dμ ;k) = w. dμ + v. dμ + k.g(k/dμ), with (1)  
ct(dμ;k) travel cost  
dμ   travel duration 
k   travel distance 
w   hourly cost of the driver 
v   hourly cost of the vehicle 
g(k/dμ)  vehicle operating costs per kilometre as a function of speed. 
 
The last component of the function, g(k/dμ) is U shaped, and so will be the 
function ct(dμ ,k), for a given distance k. This reflects the fact that starting from an 
initial situation where speed is low, transportation time reduction (speed increase) will 
result in an economy on driver and vehicle as well as a reduction of vehicle operating 
costs, however when duration decreases further (that is, speed increases), technological 
factors such as the increase in fuel consumption per kilometre have an adverse effect on 
cost reduction. Above a certain speed, provided this speed is technically feasible for the 
vehicle, the adverse effect can override the economy in labour and capital hourly costs 
and this will result in a cost increase. As far as road transportation is concerned, only 
part of the U shape curve is relevant, that is the part where cost increase with duration. 
This is due to the magnitude of the cost component corresponding to the hourly costs of 
driver and vehicle; that is such that the cost is still increasing with duration (decreasing 
with speed) for speeds around 100 km/h (base on DETR data 2001), which is larger than 
the speed at which Heavy Good Vehicles operate in normal conditions. However, in 
order to be suitable for different modes, the analyst should retain a general formulation 
where both slopes of the cost-duration relationship are available. This is for instance the 
case for rail transportation, where costs increase sharply with speed (Thompson, 1990). 
 
Whatever the mode considered, the emerging feature of the cost-benefit 
procedures currently in use in industrialized countries is that they rely on the 
relationship between transport costs and transport duration. This procedure has received 
some criticisms (Mohring and Williamson (1969),  Quarmby (1989), Cox (1992), 
Mackie et Tweddle (1992, 1993),  Allen and Baumel (1994), Aberle, Engel and Quinet 
(1993)) in that it reduces the scope of analysis to transport operations and does not take 
into account the consequences of transport time savings for the sender or the receiver of 
the good. Thus there seems to be a gap in transportation science between cost benefit 
analysis and some approaches in use in logistics that analyses the benefits of transport 
time reduction for the sender of the good. These benefits consists usually consist of the 
possibility of consolidating the distribution network in a more reduced number of depots 
and the possibility to reduce safety stocks. This latest effect is exemplified by the well 
known model of Baumol and Vinod (1980) that addresses the cost of stockholding in 
the presence of inventory costs, with a non constant demand. The approach of Baumol 
and Vinod analyses how transport duration has a cost for the sender of the good because 
there are inventory costs on the good in transit, and because there are inventory costs on 
the good in the stocks held by sender in order to avoid stock-out.  
 
A tentative conclusion here is that, although logistic science has produced a 
number of results on the effects of reduced transport time on logistical costs, such 
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considerations have been kept out of cost benefit analysis practice with a few 
exceptions1. 
Possible improvements to the current approach 
In these paragraphs we propose certain improvements to the understanding of the 
role of time in freight transportation. We will not comment further the fact that the 
transport operation is considered separated from the set of activities of the firms that 
produce the goods, as it has already been introduced above. We will rather concentrate 
on the introduction of some distinctions that seem fundamental for the understanding of 
transport time and whose omission, to our understanding is a flaw.  
 
The first distinction is straightforward and deals with the distinction between 
transport time and travel time. It is a well known observation of transport economics 
that the actual duration of travel operations represent only a limited share of transport 
duration, while many operations (cross docking, intermediate stocking, border crossing) 
where the good is not actually “travelling” occupy large slots  of time. This fact, also it 
is widely recognised, is not taken into account in the current paradigm for the valuation 
of freight time saving. 
 
The second distinction that needs to be made regards two different relationships 
with time. Some goods are produced indistinctively for the market. Thus they can be 
produced in advance, stocked and sold on request. The trade-off made by firms then is 
very much like the one described by Baumol and Vinod, where increasing the stock has 
benefits (reducing stock outs) and costs (inventory costs). There is however another 
type of goods that is made based on the specificities provided by a single customer 
(think about a car whose colour you can choose together with other customizations, or a 
pair of glasses that is made based on customer specification, or some pieces of furniture 
that can be made on order). In this latest case, there is no way a stock can be made 
where producer would pick an output unit in order to satisfy an order, and the operating 
framework of the firm is substantially different from the previous situation. Thus, there 
are two different types of goods, that create two distinctive relationships with time. We 
will refer to these two categories as “specific” versus “generic” goods.  
 
Based on these distinctions, we develop in the next section a model for analysing 
the effect of travel time savings for freight transportation. 
3. The effects of travel time savings 
 
We concentrate on the situation of specific goods that has received little attention 
from transport economists. 
                                                 
1 For instance the cost benefit analysis procedures in use in Australia take into account the 
shippers’ value of time. This is done through the allowance of 20 percent extra benefits. BETR (1999) 
Note as well that the latest release of the cost benefit analysis guidelines for France (Direction des routes 
2004) also includes a valuation of the time savings for the owner of the goods. Three figures: 0,45 € t/h , 
0,15 € t/h and 0,01 € t/h are used based on the value of the good. The guidelines however recognises that 
the inclusion of a value for the good is experimental and that the numerical values are subject to 
improvement. 
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In this section, we first examine the trade offs made by three types of agents: final 
customers (that is ordering the specific good), producers (that is the company that 
possess a good and pays for having it transported) and transport operators. The basic 
mechanisms underlying these trade offs is that the cost of the various operations that are 
involved in production and transportation varies with duration, just as what the current 
paradigm states for travel. Taking into consideration these mechanisms it is possible to 
show how profit maximising implies the choice of an optimal duration for different 
operations. It then becomes possible to characterise the situation resulting from profit 
maximising. This profit maximising situation is contingent to a given constraint on 
travel duration. When this constraint is relaxed (this is just what travel time savings is 
about) there will be some changes in the durations and the corresponding costs. These 
changes will have a value to the agents that should be the basis for the evaluation of the 
benefits of travel time saving. 
The time related trade offs involved by transport duration 
Final consumer trade off 
 
A textbook maximisation problem for the customer can be modified to include a 
preference for an anticipation of the delivery of the good that he orders. Suppose that a 
consumer satisfaction derives form the purchase of one unit of a specific good, together 
with x2 units of a generic good (or a bundle of generic goods). supposing that the price 
of x2 is the numeraire. 
Max(U(dd,x2)) s.t.: x2 + p(dd) ≤ B, with  
U, utility of the consumer,  
dd, duration for the delivery of the specific good 
p(dd) price for the specific good (depending of the delivery duration) 
x2  quantity of the numeraire good 
B, consumer’s budget. 
 
Thus, introducing the Lagrange multiplier λc, the program will be:  
Max (U(dd,x2) – λc(x2+p(dd)-B)) 
 U’x2 = λc (2) 
 U’dd = λc p’(dd)  (3)  
The latest equation can be rewritten as U’dd/λc = p’(dd) which indicates that the 
marginal willingness to pay of the final customer equates with the marginal price of 
anticipating the delivery. It is possible to derive a bid function (that is the set of price, 
duration that have the same utility). When a different customer, with different tastes and 
different budget constraints will be present on the market, the demand will consist of the 
envelope of the different bid functions. 
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Transport operator trade-off 
 
We first examine the trade-off made by the transport operator. The transport 
operator makes use of a travel operation and a set of non travel operations (to avoid 
cumbersome difficulties we will suppose that the set of operations is given, so there is 
no choice between doing or not doing a certain operation) and has to choose the 
duration dedicated to each operation. In this trade-off, he faces the constraint on 
minimum travel time, that is the keystone of the situation we study.  
 
Let's label μ (respectively μ )2 the travel (respectively non travel) operation and dμ 
(respectively dμ ) the duration dedicated to travel (respectively non travel) operations, 
and cμ(dμ) (respectively cμ ( dμ )) the cost of travel (respectively non travel) operations3. 
Eventually let's label dμmin the minimum duration of travel operation (due for instance to 
the conditions of infrastructure). Let’s label rt(dμ+ dμ ) the revenue of the transport 
operator. Actually this revenue depends only of the total of travel and non-travel time, 
irrespective of the actual decomposition. The profit maximising program of the 
transport operator will be: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ),  -   d dMax rt d d c d c dμ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ+ +  
s.t. dμ > dμmin 
 
Introducing, λt , Lagrange multiplier, associated with the constraint on duration, 
we can write :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )μ μ minμ μ μ μ μ μ t μ μd ,dMax rt d +d  -  c d  +c d -λ d -d  
Positing that the constraint is active, this will result in the condition:  
 rt'(dμmin +d* μ ) = cμ '(d* μ ) (4) 
 d*μ = dμmin (5)  
The Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint on the minimum travel 
duration is 
 λ = rt'(dμmin +d μ *)- cμ'(dμmin) (6) 
This multiplier indicates the benefits that a transport operator obtains from a 
marginal reduction of the minimum travel time. Equivalently, it expresses the 
                                                 
2 The notations μ ,  for travel, and μ , for non travel, corresponds to the distinction between 
metakinesic and ametakinesic, from the Greek word metakinesis (travel).  
3 This suppose that the cost of non travel operations does not depend on the duration of travel 
operation, and conversely. The alternative, more complex situation is discussed in 
Massiani (2005) p. 313. 
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willingness to pay of transport operators for a reduction in travel time. Thus we can use 
the notation:  
 wtpt =  rt'(dμmin +d μ *) - cμ'(dμmin) (7) 
dμmin is the minimum travel time, cμ(dμmin) is the cost of producing a trip with this 
duration, rt(dμmin + d* μ ) are the revenues of the transport operators as a function of the 
transport time that they can offer on a certain corridor. The willingness to pay of a 
transport operator for a marginal change in travel duration is the sum of the marginal 
change in transport operators’ costs and the marginal increase in transport operators’ 
revenues. The second effect, marginal increase in transport operators’ revenues, is only 
the counterpart of the willingness to pay of transport operators’ clients, that is the 
producer of the goods. This makes it necessary to analyse, in turn, the situation of the 
producer. 
 
Producers’ trade offs 
 
In this section, we suppose that a firm producing specific outputs based on 
specific inputs has to choose an optimal duration for a series of operations. We suppose 
that the firm faces three successive operations. These operations correspond to the 
procurement of inputs, the transformation of inputs into output and the outbound 
transportation. Without loss of generality, we simplify the framework of analysis by 
restricting to these three operations. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the succession of the different phases, introducing the 
notations that will be used further in this paper, where ds refers to the duration of the 
supplying phase, dp is the duration of the processing phase, dt is the duration for the 
phase of (outbound) transport. 
 
In this framework, we suppose that a given firm needs to select an optimal 
duration for each of these phases. We assume that the cost of each phase depends on the 
duration dedicated to each of them. We posit that this relationship can be represented 
through U shaped functions. This means for instance that there exists a cost minimising 
processing (/supplying/ transportation) duration, and that any deviation from this 
duration will increase the costs. This time depending costs are represented by four 
functions. 
 
 
Duration depending costs and revenues  
cs(ds),  supplying costs as a function of the supplying duration 
cp(dp),  processing costs as a function of processing duration 
ct(dt),  transportation costs as a function of the transport duration of the outputs.  
 
These costs correspond to the tariff paid by the producer to the transport operator. 
We will suppose that each of these functions is strictly positive and U shaped  
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Eventually, one should consider that the cost of transport time for the producer is 
not only consisting of the tariff paid to the transport operators but also of other 
components usually referred to as "immobilising costs". We propose to define more 
precisely these costs as consisting of three components: the financial inventory costs of 
having the good in transit, the costs of damage as far as the producer perceive them as 
proportional to the time spent in transit, the costs linked with the physical change of the 
good during the transportation (this particularly applies to perishable goods). We will 
refer to these 3 costs as "generalised immobilisation costs" and denote it with the 
following function:  
 
ci(dt) generalised immobilisation costs as a function of the transport duration.  
 
This function is supposed to be monotonic strictly increasing:  
 ci’dt  > 0 (8)  
No specific hypothesis is made on the convexity of the function, and we will 
consider in the remaining part of this article that the second order derivative of ci(dt) is 
zero. 
 
Apart from costs, duration also impact revenues because, as analysed in the 
previous section, clients are willing to pay more in order to receive their goods sooner. 
This can be expressed by the function r(ds+dp+dt), that makes the revenue depend of the 
duration between order and delivery, we will suppose that r(ds+dp+dt) is differentiable 
and monotonously decreasing, that is:  
 r'ds =  r’dp =  r’dt  < 0 (9) 
 
Profit maximising 
In this framework the maximisation program of the firm becomes:  
( ) ( )s p t s p t t, , r(d +d +d ) - cs(d ) + cp(d )+ct(d )+ci(d )s p td d dMax ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
 
Assuming that all functions involved in the trade-off are differentiable, one can 
write the first order conditions as:  
 r'ds = cs'ds (10) 
 r'dp = cp'dp  (11) 
 r'dt = ct'dt+ci'dt (12) 
these conditions are illustrated in Figure 1. They can be summarised in: 
 
 r'ds - ci'dt =  r'dp - ci'dt =  r'dt - ci'dt = cs'ds - ci'dt  = cp'dp - ci'dt = ct'dt   (13) 
 
Recording that revenues are decreasing with duration: (r'ds = r'dt = r'dp <0) and that 
generalized immobilisation costs are increasing with transport duration (ci'dt>0), we can 
show: cs'ds < 0 , cp'dp <0, ct'dt < 0. These latest inequalities mean that the profit 
maximising durations chosen by the producer will be located on the downard slope of 
the three different cost curves. In other words, when the producers maximise profit, it is 
in a situation where costs would be reduced by an increase in duration. Equation (13) 
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also provides a formal expression to the willingness of the producer to reduce transport 
time that is: the sum of the extra cost it would encure in reducing the duration dedicated 
to other operations (purchase and production), plus the reduction in generalised 
immobilisation costs during transportation. 
 
Figure 1 - duration of the different phases involved in the specific good producer trade-off. 
 
r(ds+dp+dt) 
Time dtdp ds 
ct(dt)+ci(dt) 
cs(t0)
cp(dp)
r(d*s+d*p+d*t) 
cs(d*s) 
cp(d*p) 
ct(d*t) 
Supplying Producing Transport 
 
Consequences of travel time saving  
Based on the description of the trade offs that we have presented in the latest 
section, we investigate the consequences of an exogenous change in travel time. This 
change is typically a consequence of an intervention of public authority. This can be an 
increase in infrastructure capacity, a change in regulation that modifies traffic 
conditions, or any action that makes it possible for vehicles to move faster on the 
network. This change is represented by a shift in dμmin.  
 
Consequence for the transport operator 
 
The change in the transport operator’s situation can be represented as in Figure 2. 
The horizontal axis represents time. On this axis, two values for dμmin are represented. 
dμmin is the ex ante minimum travel time and d’μmin is the ex post minimum travel time. 
The curve cμ represents the travel cost. The doted portion of this curve corresponds to 
unattainable duration in the ex ante situation. The grey line in the upper right part of the 
graph represents the transport cost, that is, the sum of travel and non travel costs. As 
non travel costs are strictly positive, the curve ct( dμ +dμmin) is above the  travel cost 
curve. As non travel duration is positive, the curve ct( dμ +dμmin) is located to the right of 
the truncation of cμ(dμ) in dμmin. Supposing that the constraint on dμmin is binding in the 
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ex post as well as in the ex ante situation, the shift of the point dμmin will result in a shift 
in the transport cost curve ct( dμ  + dμmin). 
Figure 2 - Consequences of travel time reduction on the transport operator 
 Cost 
t=dminμ+dμt=dμ
min
exante t=d’μmin 
Reduction in minimum travel time 
cμ(d’μmin) 
cμ(dμmin) 
] 
ctdmin(dμmin + dμ ),  
ex ante transport cost 
cμ(dμ) 
travel cost 
ctdmin(d’μmin + dμ ) 
ex post transport cost
] 
 
 
Consequences for the producer 
 
The change in transport operator’s supply curve will change the parameters of the 
profit maximising for the producer. Panel 1 in Figure 3 represents the ex ante (before 
the change in dmin) situation. In this situation the marginal temporal conditions given by 
equation (13) are respected. 
 
When the minimum travel time is changed, the transport operator will face a 
transport cost curve that has lower costs for a given duration or, lower duration for a 
given cost.  This is reflected in the second panel of Figure 3.  
 
This may however not be an equilibrium as the marginal temporal conditions are 
not respected anymore. For instance on panel 2 of Figure 3, r’() is larger (in absolute 
value) than the other temporal marginal costs. Thus, it is possible for the producer to 
increase its profit by reducing the durations dedicated to the different operations and 
anticipating the arrival of the goods at the destination. This will improve also the 
situation of the customer as long as its marginal willingness to pay is smaller than 
marginal cost of anticipating the arrival of its goods. 
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Figure 3 - Consequences of a shift in minimum travel time on the equilibrium 
  ' 
r(da+dp+ds
time d*td*p d*s
ct(dt)+ci(dt)
cs(ds)
cp(dp)
]
1  - Ex ante equilibrium (dmin) 
]
2  - The shift in dμmin shifts ct(dt) and modifies r' 
]
dμmin
]
d'μmin
]
]
3  - To restore profit maximising conditions, durations and costs are changed ulteriorly  
time d*td*p d*s 
d’*td’*p d’*s
time 
cμ(dμ)
ct(dt)+ci(dt)
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Synthesis 
 
The investigation of the consequences of a change in dμmin for a transport operator 
and a producer suggests a more general presentation of the effects of a diminution of 
travel time. One observes that the producer and the transport operator equate the 
marginal temporal costs of all their operations, except for the ones whose durations are 
constrained. 
 
Suppose a process defined as a set of successive operations i. The operations in 
the process can be made by one single or by several firms. The cost c(di) of each 
operation depends on its duration di. The relation between cost and duration can take 
two different forms: it can be (1) U shaped, or (2) monotonic increasing4. The 
operations are suitably defined so that only one single operation occurs at a time5. 
Suppose that this process is producing an output whose price r(d) is variable in function 
of its whole duration. Suppose also that at least one operation has a constraint on its 
duration. Thus the profit maximising of the different agents are such that: 
• c’dj = r’dj ∀ j ∈ J. where j refers to operations whose durations are not 
constrained by a minimum. 
• dk = dkmin ∀ k ∈ K, where k refers to operations whose duration are 
constrained by a minimum in the optimal situation. 
• r(d)=r(Σdj + Σdk) refers to duration depending revenues. 
 
The equilibrium resulting from this situation can be understood using a Newtonian 
metaphor: r is acting as a force that tends to attract all operations to their minimum 
durations. This attraction force encounters two sorts of resistance: the first one is based 
on the increase in costs when duration is reduced, the second one consists in the 
existence of ‘physical’ constraints on the duration of certain operations. 
 
Within this simplified framework, the question on the value of freight time saving 
is to know the effects of a shift of the constraint of one of the operations whose duration 
is constrained, on the equilibrium of the whole system. 
 
These effects will be of three sorts: 
• the shift of the constraint on its own cost curve will reduce the cost of this 
operation, 
• the whole duration of the process will be reduced, in a first instance, 
according to the change in the constraint, 
• the duration of the other operations will be changed so as to recreate the 
equilibrium conditions, this will alter both the duration and the costs of the 
whole process. In this latest change the cost may increase, but this increase 
will be inferior to the increase in benefits from the customers (if not, the 
agents would not engage into such transactions). 
                                                 
4 the situation of monotonic increasing costs, that was not presented in the simplified economy 
discussed in the previous section is included here. This allows the author to make the presentation more 
general and to take into account operations such a warehousing, whose cost is monotonic. 
5 If different costs incur at the same time, they should be reflected in one single operation. This is 
the case for instance of generalized immobilization costs, that are included into the costs of the 
transportation operation.  
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The effects of steps 1 and 2 are represented in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 - Consequences of a reduction of the minimum duration 
 Costs and 
Revenues 
ddmink d’mink 
Reduction in minimum time for operation k 
c(d’kmin) 
c(dkmin) 
] 
Min Σci(di), st Σdi=d 
dk>dkmin 
ex ante cost  
c(dk) 
cost of operation k 
Min Σci(di), st Σdi=d 
dk>d’kmin 
ex post cost  
] 
r(d)  
 
 
4. Welfare effects 
In the previous section, we have analysed the consequences of a shift in the 
minimum travel time on the costs, revenues and utility of the different economic agents. 
In this section we proceed with the investigation of the normative value that should be 
assigned to travel time savings. We shift from the value of time as an object to the value 
of time as a norm. 
 
We base our analysis not on the final equilibrium reached by the market after all 
the adjustments are made, but on the intermediate situation given reflected by panel 2 in 
Figure 3 or to point 2 of the numbered list at the end of section 0. This provides a lower 
boundary to the welfare effects as the extra effects that are not taken into account in this 
measure can only increase welfare (that is, they increase the profit of producers, and 
they improve the situation of the customer up to the point where the marginal benefits 
of a decrease in delivery time equals its marginal price). Label W, a measure of the 
welfare effects of Δdμmin a reduction of minimum travel time. Wl(Δdμmin) is a lower 
boundary to W such that:  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )minmin l min min * min * min * min * c
 Anticipated deliveryChange in transport cost Change in immobilization costs
wtp dW d W d ct d' ,d - ct d ,d - ci d' +d - ci d +d + μμ μ μ μ μ μμ μ μ μ ΔΔ ≥ Δ − ×  14424431444442444443 1444442444443
 
 
with  
dμmin  ex ante minimum travel duration 
d’μmin   ex post minimum travel duration 
*dμ   optimal non travel duration in the ex ante situation 
ct(dμmin, *dμ ) transportation cost, 
wtpc  willingness to pay of the consumer for a reduction of delivery time, 
ci( )  immobilizing costs during the transport. 
 
Thus the welfare effects of a reduction in travel time can be seen as the sum of 
three components. Ideally the analyst may wish to take into account these three values 
separately, but this may however not be necessary. Indeed, one can use the equilibrium 
conditions presented in section 2 to provide an estimate of Wl without the need for a 
decomposition. This can be done using the linkage between the willingness to pay of the 
different agents (final costumers, producers, transport operators) such as illustrated 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Willingness to pay for a time saving for different types of agents 
Agent Duration Willingness to pay 
Final consumers   
Specific good "order to delivery" wtpc = U’ta/λ , with:  
wtpc  Willingness to pay of the consumer,  
U’ta Marginal utility of anticipating the reception of the 
good,  
λ Marginal utility of money.  
 
Generic good  
Producers  
Specific good Transport duration  wtpsp = ci't - r't, with: 
Willingness to pay of the producer of a specific good for a time 
saving, 
Marginal generalized immobilization costs of the producer, 
Marginal temporal revenues.  
Generic good  as expressed for instance in the Baumol Vinod model.  
Transport operators Travel duration  wtpt =  -rt'(dμmin +d μ *) + cμ'(dμ
min), with  
willingness to pay of the transport operator, 
marginal travel costs, 
marginal revenues of the transport operator. 
 
The relationships between the willingness to pay of the different agents provide 
results that are relevant to the evaluation of freight transport time saving benefits. 
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First, one should consider that the marginal revenues of transport operators for a 
transport time saving are equal to the willingness to pay of the producers for a marginal 
saving in transport time, and the marginal increase in revenues for the producers equates 
the willingness to pay of the final consumer for a faster delivery. Thus for a specific 
good:  
t p tawtp =c' (d )+wtp =c' +ci'+U' /μ μ μ λ  
it can be found that the transport operators’ willingness to pay for a travel time 
saving, incorporates the different components that affect the welfare:  
• The consequences of a travel time reduction on the production cost of transport 
services. 
• The generalized immobilization cost of the producer. 
• The willingness to pay of the final customer for an anticipation of the delivery of 
the good. 
 
A second result, is that equity questions are relevant for the valuation of freight 
value of time. This emerges for two reasons. Indeed the willingness to pay of final 
consumer for a reduction in delivery time depends on the marginal utility of money. 
This implies in turn, that the willingness to pay of the producer for a faster 
transportation, and of the transport operator for a faster travel will depend on the 
revenues of the clients for which the good are transported. There is a second aspect of 
equity, that could be hid by the first one, but that appears if we suppose a hypothetical 
situation where the willingness to pay of the customer is null, thus cancelling the first 
effect. In this case the welfare effects given by Wl represent the decrease of production 
costs of the whole production system (that is transformation of the good and 
transportation). This cost reduction can be accepted as a welfare measure only if one 
assumes that the initial distribution of revenues is optimal. 
 
In the following section we investigate what figure can be placed on Wl lower 
boundaries of the welfare effects of travel time saving, and we asses the impact of a 
change in freight value of time on the cost benefit analysis of a set of transport related 
projects in the UK. 
Impact of revised freight values of time on cost benefit analysis 
In the preceding section, we have shown that, provided we neglect some second 
order effects and distributional implications, the information on the transport operators’ 
value of time can be used as a normative value to monetize the consequences on the 
different economic agents of a change in travel time. Another possibility is to account 
separately for the different effects. We discuss in turn these two possibilities with 
special consideration of the availability of empirical quantifications. 
 
Using transport operators’ willingness to pay 
 
Table 2 indicates different results estimating the transport operators willingness to 
pay for a travel time saving. 
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Table 2 - Value of time for transport operators  
Study Method Vehicles Euro (98) Country Year 
Fosgerau,  
Fix link  of 
the 
Storebaelt, 
S.P. 
S.P. mode choice  
road+ ferry vs. road 
+ bridge  
 
“trucks” 
“road train” 
“articulated 
vehicle”. 
47,64 /veh.h. 
23,79 /veh.h. 
 
21,44 /veh.h. 
Denmark 1989 
Rio Antirio  
Project 
(TRD, 
1995). 
 
R.P. Trucks 
 
From 29,81 /veh.h à 
31,26 veh.h. 
 
Greece 1994 
L. Wynter, 
(1995) S.P. 
S.P.: Transfer Price  
 
Road (itinerary 
choice) 
74,03 /h. veh France 1994 
L. Wynter, 
(1995) R.P. 
R.P., logit Road (itinerary 
choice) 
27,71 /h.shipment France 1994 
Blauwens 
G., Van de 
Voorde,  
(1988) 
Aggregated R.P. Intermodal 
road, 
inland Navigation 
0,0000848 * value of 
the shipment 
Belgium 1981 
 
The figures reported in Table 2 are puzzling, and it seems that they do not make it 
possible to propose a figure for freight value of time with a certain degree of generality. 
This is however not surprising considering the difference in context between interviews. 
It is likely that the different parameters determining the value of time in different 
locations are different.  
 
For this reason it seems highly speculative to say how much of the value of time is 
omitted in current cost benefit analysis. Also, one can note that the empirical results 
available somehow contrast with the theoretical expectations that the willingness to pay 
of the transport operators for travel time savings should exceed the willingness to pay of 
the producer. No such pattern is emerging in the comparison of the value of time 
estimates available from different field studies. The empirical evidence leave space for 
nothing more than tentative proposals. A possible compromise, also highly speculative, 
would be to consider a value of 35 euro per veh.hour.  
 
Apart from the lack of consolidated empirical results, another difficulty is that the 
use of the transport operators’ value of time in order to summarise different welfare 
effects of travel time savings (production costs of transport operations, production costs 
of the producers, preference for an anticipated delivery of the final customer) is both an 
advantage and an inconvenience. It can be an inconvenience indeed, because it is not 
possible to use extra information on one of the components. This can be especially the 
case when considering that travel cost component of the value of time because the 
marginal economy in travel costs due to faster transportation depends on the ex ante 
speed of travel. Thus when using a single aggregated value of time that entails the 
different component with no further decomposition, the extra information that may be 
available to the analyst on the travel cost reduction cannot be included (unless 
cumbersome and uncertain calculations are made) in the computation. 
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Using separate estimates of the different components of the benefits 
 
The second solution, is to use a separate estimate of the extra benefits, that are 
not included in transport operation costs and add them explicitly to the transport 
operator costs. This second solution is attractive but it raises a number of issues. The 
first issue is that the willingness to pay of producers is expressed based on shipments, 
while the cost benefit analysis of transport projects makes use of vehicle flow. Though 
some data are available on the number of shipments per vehicle, this conversion factor 
may be extremely variable from one situation to the other. This probably makes the use 
of transport operators’ willingness to pay as an estimate of the extra benefits 
problematic. 
 
To conclude on this point, the two possibilities that are available to take into 
account the full benefits of travel time savings both raise difficulties and this point 
probably needs not only further investigation from the community of transport scientists 
but as well a larger number of field data results. 
Sensitivity of Cost Benefit analysis to an increase in the value of time 
Finally, we investigate how the effect of an increase in the value of time for 
freight transportation used in Cost benefit analysis would affect the outcome of cost 
benefit analysis. In the absence of consolidated results we base our simulation on a 20 
percent increase in the value of travel time savings. Table 3 provides the main outcome 
of cost benefit analysis for ten different road projects in the UK. These data are based 
on the Appraisal Summary Tables elaborated by the Department of Environment 
Transport and the Regions. The second column in Table 3 indicates an increase in the 
monetary value of freight time saving when the full benefits are taken into account6. 
The following columns indicate how much this increase represents compared with the 
present value of Travel Time savings, the total benefits and the net value of benefits.  
 
                                                 
6 In this table, we refer to freight value of time as the value of HGV + the fraction of Light Good 
Vehicles that corresponds to work time Considering that only very synthetic information is available in 
the Appraisal Summary Table, some assumption had to be made to complement missing information. 
Usually ASP provide information only for the share of HGV. To complement this data assumptions were 
made regarding: the share of non-car among non-HGV veh (20 percent), the share of light good vehicles 
among non-car non HGV (80 percent) and the share of work time in LGV time (88 percent). 
Given these assumptions, the results of the calculation should be considered as an approximation.  
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Table 3: sensitivity analysis of Cost Benefit analysis 
  Impact on total 
Present Value of 
Benefits of Travel 
Time Saving 
  
Impact on 
total 
benefits 
Impact on 
net value 
of 
benefits 
Benefit 
Cost 
Ratio 
Benefit 
Cost ratio 
  m£ % increase 
 
  
Full 
benefits 
 Current 
assessment 
procedures 
 M1 J 31-32 (GO-YH)  1,4 5,6% 5,6% 6,1% 11,48 10,87 
 M1 J6A-10 (GOER)  14,2 5,0% 4,6% 5,6% 5,96 5,70 
 A63-Selby  4,3 3,9% 3,9% 5,0% 5,19 5,00 
 Whetherby/Walshford (YH)  10,5 6,6% 5,6% 7,5% 4,56 4,32 
 A303 Sparkford-Ilchester  1,0 3,6% 3,2% 4,3% 4,14 4,01 
 M6 J16-19 Widening (GONW)  16,1 6,4% 6,2% 8,5% 3,68 3,47 
 A556 (M) M6-M56 Link (GONW)  8,8 5,5% 4,6% 6,7% 3,55 3,39 
 M25 J.16 (M40) to J.19 (A41) 
(GOER)  
8,0 5,0% 5,0% 7,3% 3,36 3,20 
 A5 Nesscliffe  0,3 4,7% 2,1% 3,7% 2,41 2,36 
 A3 Hindhead (Gose)  0,9 3,9% 1,6% 6,7% 1,34 1,32 
 
It appears that the impact represents a small percentage increase in total benefits. 
Such figure appears modest, although one should not forget that they can make the 
difference between a project whose assessment is positive and a project whose 
assessment is negative. 
 
The last two colons of Table 3 also indicate the change in the value of the Benefit 
Cost Ratio when the full benefits of transport time savings are taken into account. The 
pattern emerging from these two columns suggests that the ordering of projects based 
on Benefit Costs ratio is not upset when the full benefits of freight travel time savings 
are taken into account. This evidence should however not be generalized, and the 
finding could be different if we were to consider some projects that are more 
specifically related to freight. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this article we have investigated how the welfare effects of freight travel time 
savings should be accounted for in cost benefit analysis. 
 
Our findings are that the understanding of the welfare effects of freight travel time 
saving should at least take into consideration two distinctions: specific versus generic 
goods and travel time versus non travel time (transport time is the sum of travel time 
and non travel time). 
 
When such distinctions are taken into account, it is possible to characterize how 
different economic agents trade off between duration and costs of different successive 
operations. This provides a formal expression of different agents’ willingness to pay for 
a marginal change in the duration of a certain operation. This also provides a description 
 19
of the ex ante equilibrium, that is the equilibrium that takes place subject to an initial 
level of the minimum travel time duration. It then becomes possible to analyse the 
consequences of a shift in the minimum travel time. This provides a positive description 
of freight value of time. Using this positive description it is possible to propose a 
normative value of time. Our results regarding this normative value of time are two 
folds. First, it appears much more tractable to propose a lower boundary for the 
quantification of the welfare effects of travel time savings than to take into 
consideration all the benefits that could derive from further adjustments of the different 
agents. Considering a lower boundary to the welfare effects of freight travel time 
savings concentrate on first order effects and assume that the consequences of the 
curvatures of the different costs and revenue functions can be neglected. Another aspect 
on which our analysis shed light on is that of the distributional implications of freight 
value of time. Actually, there is no reason, apart from disciplinary distance and 
analytical difficulties, to consider that the value of time used for the evaluation of 
freight value of time have no distributional effect.  
 
Regarding the numerical evaluation of a monetary equivalent to freight time 
saving, we demonstrate that the elicitation of transport operators’ willingness to pay 
offers an attractive way to summarise the welfare effects of time savings. However, 
empirical results are not converging and the comparison of available evidences is 
inconclusive. Whatsoever, it appears that the welfare effects are larger than the one 
accounted for in the factor costs method. Thus one should make allowance for these 
extra benefits in cost benefit analysis of transport projects. Based on a tentative 
allowance of 20 percent extra benefits, it is found that the net benefit of a randomly 
selected set of UK road projects exhibit an increase of 3,7 percent up to 7,5 percent, 
while the ranking of the project is not upset. The sensitivity of the net benefits to the full 
benefits value of time is not minor, and would be sufficient to reverse the outcome of 
cost-benefit analysis of a number of projects. 
 
Eventually, our analysis suggest that it would be relevant for transport economists 
to have more empirical estimates of the value of time for freight based on surveys, 
whether SP or RP, made among hauliers, this contrast with the practice that during the 
latest decades has concentrated on the value of time for shippers.  
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